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In order to have the public funds necessary for its development, Niger is examining the 
possibility of expanding its Value- added tax (VAT) tax base to exempted goods and basic 
food products. This proposal has prompted violent opposition leading to the question of the 
social impacts of taxation. The first micro-macro computable general equilibrium model of 
Niger's actual economy has been developed. This model allows analysis of the social impact 
and distributional analysis of the following VAT structures: a pure VAT structure, a structure 
maintaining certain exemptions, and a multiple-rate VAT structure. The model’s results 
shows that although restoring the VAT rate would be socially costly compared to the initial 
situation, the distributional impact of the VAT differs according to the system implemented in 
the country.  Maintaining VAT exemptions in food crop agriculture sectors associated with a 
tax base expansion in the remaining sectors will increase public revenue while taking into 
account the national goal of poverty reduction. The net social impact of exoneration depends 
on the economic structure of the concerned sector. If the national goal is the end of 
exemption, the model shows that applying a pure VAT conforming to the theory is preferable 
in terms of economic growth whereas applying a reduced-rate on food crop agriculture 
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Introduction  
Niger has reinforced its value-added tax (VAT) system in view of successfully completing its 
fiscal transition and mobilizing resources required for its development. According to the 
available statistics (UEMOA, 2008), Niger nonetheless remains one of the WAEMU countries 
with the lowest overall public tax collection rates.1 In 2009 Niger had a fiscal pressure rate of 
13.9% and an average of 10.1% from 1998 to 2005 which is lower than the average of 
14.08% of the GDP over the same period in the WAEMU.2 In 2005, the VAT revenues were 
roughly 5% of the GDP, one of the lowest tax ratios in Africa. The VAT efficiency ratio 
constructed by Ebrill and Keen (2001) 3 gives an average of 27% for Sub-Saharan African 
countries and 24% for Niger in 2005. It varies between 23% and 36% for the other WAEMU 
countries, except for Togo and Senegal whom have a much better performance. 
Faced with this situation and in view of improving the returns of the internal indirect tax, the 
Nigerien government has tried to reduce VAT exemptions by extending the tax base to 
include basic food products. Exemption of these consumer goods indeed yields significant 
tax loss. Consumer goods represent an important share of transactions in the country but are 
often exempted or exchanged in the under-taxed traditional sector. Besides an increase in 
public revenue, the end of VAT exemptions should restore economic neutrality.  
In a national and international poverty reduction strategies context it is important to assess 
the social impacts of this type of reform and to understand whether reinforcing public 
revenues might hamper efforts made to reduce poverty. The relation existing between the 
increase in public revenues and the establishment of effective poverty reduction programs is 
not always confirmed in the short term (Filmer et al., 1998; Gauthier, 2007). This enables the 
hypothesis that the social objectives of the country should be taken into account right from 
the definition of the characteristics of public tax collection. The increase in fiscal pressure can 
be seen as legitimate by the population only if it is quickly associated with effective public 
expenditure allowing an improvement in the welfare of populations and a reduction in 
                                                          
1
 It is important to remember, however, that current comparison in terms of level of tax collection 
between WAEMU countries is somewhat biased by the lack of harmonization of ways to calculate the 
level of fiscal pressure. The rate of fiscal pressure is generally calculated by the relation between total 
tax revenues and the GDP, but the difference is due to the composition of the numerator. The 
comparison can be solid only when all countries use the same calculation basis, which hardly seems 
to be the case today. 
2 
Niger, Finance ministry, Institut National de la Statistique, (2008). Report « L’analyse de la politique 
fiscale au Niger et ses impacts sur la pauvreté ». 
3 
Ebrill and Keen (2001) have advanced efficiency differences of the VAT according to the economic 
and social structures of countries and have attempted to classify the countries and regions of the world 
according to VAT efficiency. The traditional measure is the “efficiency ratio”—the ratio of VAT 
revenues to the GDP divided by the standard VAT rate, that is, the single rate normally applied over all 
products. The efficiency ratio of a VAT system with satisfactory functioning is situated between 40% 
and 50% 
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poverty. With this hypothesis, it is important to analyze the impact of the end of exemptions 
in an economy like Niger and define in what way a VAT structure could support the poor. 
This analysis primarily seeks to determine the household categories most affected in terms 
of increased poverty and inequalities. The distributional consequences of introducing various 
tax systems was evaluated by using a computable general equilibrium model (CGEM) 
representing the Nigerien economy linked to a micro-simulation model (Decaluwe et al., 
1999). 
The remainder of this paper is split up into four sections. In the first, we present the 
characteristics of the VAT structure in Niger and some assumptions about the social 
incidence of the end of VAT exemptions in Niger.  The micro macro CGE model is presented 
in the second section. The third focuses on the definition of the VAT scenarios and the 
analysis of the aforesaid scenario’s simulation. In the last section, we make some concluding 
comments. 
 
1. The Nigerien choices regarding internal indirect taxation structure:  
a. An imperfect VAT structure regardless to the theory:  
The VAT was established in Niger on January 1, 1986. At the beginning, there were three 
VAT rates: 35%, 25%, and 15%. In 1994, these rates respectively became 24%, 17%, and 
10%. In 1990, five years after the implementation of the VAT, comparable collection had 
decrease by more than 40%. This decline cannot be explained by movement in GDP which 
increased but by the importance increase of transaction exempt from VAT. Since 1998, Niger 
has had to conform to WAEMU directives regarding indirect taxation:4 choosing a single VAT 
rate ranging from 15% to 20%, harmonizing taxable goods and exemptions, possibly 
applying the VAT to the agricultural sector, and excluding transport activities. One of the 
objectives is to increase the taxation of the informal sector. Starting in January 2000, Niger 
thus implemented a single-rate VAT of 17%. In May 2000, with the establishment of the 
common external tariff and the expected decrease in customs revenues, the VAT rate 
climbed to 18% then to 19% in 2002. 
The imperfections of the Nigerien VAT system are numerous compared to a “pure” VAT as 
prescribed by economic theories (Chambas, 2005; Ebrill and al., 2001). Between 2003 and 
2005, legal exemptions still represented on average more than 43% of the internal VAT yield 
and exempted consumptions represented 48.6% of the consumption of Nigerien households 
living in Niamey. In rural areas, the VAT base represents only 43.1% of final consumption 
                                                          
4
 Directives No. 02/98CM/UEMOA on VAT and No. 03/98/CM/UEMOA on excise duties. 
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due to the VAT does not apply only to monetary consumptions.5 It should be noted that VAT 
exemptions do not concern only commodities consumed by poor populations but increasingly 
extend to the industrial sector (mines and agro-food industry) for a more or less lengthy 
period. In addition to reducing the tax base, VAT exemptions create distortions within the 
economy that could have consequences on the economic level activity and on the poverty 
level.  
b. The economic and social implications of exemptions 
VAT exemptions and production  
To avoid creating economic distortions, the VAT should theoretically be neutral in the 
production and distribution chain (for the producer, wholesaler, and retailer). Exemptions 
occur when output is untaxed but input tax is not recoverable. Exemptions break the VAT 
chain and create a cascading effect. The tax has to be paid by the producer using the 
exempted item, and no longer by the final consumer. This cascade effect increases 
production costs and creates distortions in the production choices. Contrary to common 
belief, the VAT 6no longer equals a consumption tax when exemptions are granted. The only 
way for the producer to remain neutral when faced with VAT exemptions would be to be able 
to charge this additional tax burden to the consumer by raising the sales price. This 
behaviour would be possible if the supply was very elastic and if the producer could fix the 
price.  
Likewise, when the zero VAT rate on exported goods is not applied, the VAT credits of 
exporting firms are not reimbursed by the government and the problem is the same as in the 
presence of exemptions. The VAT cascading effect, which leads to the competitiveness of 
local producers in terms of international trading, creates a negative effective protection 
(Bonjean and Chambas, 2001). In this case, the VAT has functioned largely as a tax on 
exports. The existence of informal sector can also create distortion in VAT application 
(Emran and Stigltiz, 2005).  Indeed, the informal sector is taxed by the VAT when it 
purchases its inputs from the formal sector: it then cannot obtain any credit refund for its tax 
credits because it is non-taxable. 
The reduction in exemptions and effective application of the zero VAT rate should enable an 
increase in the country's economic efficiency and hence improve allocations of resources. 
From a social standpoint, any additional burden for the producer impacts the poverty level of 
the country by provoking a slow-down in the production system and a decrease in revenues 
                                                          
5
 1999 survey on household consumption and data from the Ministère de l’économie et des finances, 
Institut National de la Statistique du Niger, (2008) Report « L’analyse de la politique fiscale au Niger et 
ses impacts sur la pauvreté ». 
6 Exemption may be defines either in terms of particular commodities or in terms of particular trader. 
Only the first one is studied here. 
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from the production. Nevertheless, the end of exemptions can have an ambiguous effect in 
terms of poverty, as the latter also depends on households' ability to access basic goods. 
VAT exemptions and consumption  
A “pure” VAT must also be neutral for the consumer. A uniform taxation avoids distortion 
between prices of goods available on the territory. This is no longer the case when one of the 
goods is exempted or subject to a reduced rate. The relative decrease in retail price of this 
good compared with other goods subject to a full rate can make it preferable for other 
substitutable goods and thus modifies the economic structure of the demand.  
From a social point of view, the VAT does not take into account each individual's ability to 
pay. In this context, exemptions can improve the country's situation by enabling consumers 
to have access to basic goods at lower prices. In a context of agricultural prices instability7, 
an ad valorem tax like VAT can quickly increase  tax burdens in household budgets.. In a 
country where 62.1% of the population lives below the poverty line (QUIBB_ 2005) and 34% 
in extreme poverty, where subsidies targeted at the level of household income are nearly 
inexistent, taxation can constitute an instrument to fight poverty.  The progressivity of this 
type of measure is still limited compared to subsidies (Alderman, 2002; Ebrill et al., 2001). 
Indeed, exemptions apply to a consumer good and not to a targeted population. The social 
effect thus depends on the consumption structure of the various social groups. The tax 
burden on the consumer is all the heavier as consumers demand is inelastic, which is the 
case with basic food products. 
VAT exemptions thus have an ambiguous impact on the poverty level. The distribution of the 
tax burden depends on the structure of the market as well as the nature of the social groups 
concerned by the exemptions. The levels of production and consumption are interdependent, 
and the poverty situations of households are a function of their activity sector and their 
consumption structure.    
VAT exemption and public revenue: 
First, the problem of VAT application creates a gap between the VAT nominal rate and the 
effective VAT rate. Secondly, the tax expenditure brought about by VAT exemptions is 
difficult to evaluate (Gautier, 1999): “Although the government loses revenues on the sales of 
non-taxable firms, it completely reclaims the non-exempted inputs of these same firms.” The 
effect therefore depends on the net value of the tax base.8 In addition, the various systems 
                                                          
7
 In 2005, Niger experienced inflationary pressure notably owing to a strong reduction in agricultural 
production in 2004 due to climate problems. 
8
 According to Gautier (1999), “Net losses in government revenues are then equal to the sum of sales 
of exempted firms, from which are subtracted the sum of non-exempted inputs purchased by non-
taxable branches, and exempted sales purchased by taxable firms.” 
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can significantly disrupt the application of legislation and lead to increased fraud.  
The end of exemption forces the government to choose a new VAT structure supporting the 
poor: that is a uniform rate structure close to a pure VAT structure or the introduction of a 
reduce rate on large consumption goods. Lots of studies present the qualities of the both 
system (Gautier, 2001; Ebrill et al., 2001).  
 
2. A computable general equilibrium model to study the social impact of 
expanding the tax base  
Computable general equilibrium models (CGEM) have often been used to evaluate the 
macroeconomic impact of a tax reform, as presented in the literature review of Shoven and 
Whalley (1984) or Burgess and Stern (1993). Lots of MEGC have been used to study the 
impact of trade tax decrease (Clarete and Whalley, 1987; Cockburn, 2004) and more 
generally the impact of a change in national tax structure (Toh and al. 2005).  VAT is usually 
conceptualized as a uniform consumption tax (Serra-Puche 1984 ; Ballard and Shoven, 
1985, Ballard and al. 1987). Little CGEM take into account the intern complexity of VAT 
system while literature talks about it (Ebrill and al., 2001). Bovenberg (1987), Emini (2000) 
Giesecke and Nhi (2010) have examined the impact of the various VAT systems in a given 
economy. They discuss the possibility of moving away from a uniform taxation rate by 
multiplying rates and the possibility to exempt goods. The key variables in the analysis are 
consumption, sectoral factor reallocation, production, government revenue, and household 
welfare. Emini (2000) showed that by postulating budget neutrality with a lower level of 
taxation than the one set down in the finance act, re-establishing VAT neutrality by 
expanding the tax base enables economic expansion and an increase in household welfare 
compared to the initial situation. An increase in inequalities between household categories 
must nonetheless be noted. When Emini rejects the hypothesis of budget neutrality and re-
establishes the VAT at the official rate, he shows that the sudden increase in VAT leads to a 
strong loss in reallocation, especially for sectors with a weak ex ante tax burden. In this 
context, household welfare decreases, as inequalities.  
The model used aims to take into account imperfections at the level of the VAT system 
by modelling, starting with the initial situation, the existence of VAT exemptions in certain 
sectors of the Nigerien economy. It also aims to compare the social impact of different VAT 
systems ranging from single-rate to multiple-rate and to the preservation of certain 
exemptions on agricultural goods. We aim to analyse the impact of these changes on poverty 
and inequalities while taking into account heterogeneity in the structure of household income 
and expenses. We have constructed a CGEM micro-simulation to achieve this goal. This is 
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the first time this technique has been used to address this type of problems, as authors 
frequently use CGEMs with representative agents9. 
Nigerien data  
The model used data from a social accounting matrix (SAM) of the Niger economy for 2004 
and a household survey Questionnaire unifié des Indicateurs de base du bien-être (QUIBB) 
for 2005. The information on Nigerien tax structure is provided by the country's fiscal office 
for the year 2006. 
The SAM has been aggregated to cover five sectors: food crop agriculture, export 
agriculture, industry10  and services, the retail branch and transportation, as well as the 
production of public services by the government. The aggregation of the SAM provides a way 
to make up for the weakness in tax information. The distinction between food crop agriculture 
and export agriculture offers a way to take into account specific characteristics of these two 
agricultural sectors a primarily informal part of agriculture, an under-taxed locally consumed, 
and a primarily exported form of agriculture. 
Primary sector production is predominant in Niger. Agricultural production, including export 
agriculture and food crop agriculture, represents 40.6% of national value added. Services 
constitutes 23.9% of the country's total value added, followed by industry with 19.3%. 
Extraction industries with the mining sector, gold and uranium, produce 9% of total value 
added. Agriculture has a high value added rate, respectively 91.7% for non-exporting food 
crop agriculture and 85.4% for export agriculture, based on the weak use of intermediate 
inputs. Trade with the rest of the world is concentrated in the industry sector (68.6% of 
exports and 85.1% of imports). Export agriculture represents 31.4% of exports and food crop 
agriculture, 10.4% of imports. The penetration rate of imports in the country is 18.53% and 
these imports are foremost made up of industrial goods, but available goods on the territory 
are nevertheless mostly locally produced. The labour factor receives the largest share of 
value added, primarily from the agricultural sectors. The informal sector (principally 
agriculture and trade) constitutes 70 to 80% of traded GDP, employs a large share of the 
population, and contributes to social stability by enabling populations to have a source of 
income. Households acquire their income from labour (91.3%) and capital (5.3%) but also 
transfers from government (2.5%) and the rest of the world (1%). Their main expenditure 
item is food. 
                                                          
9
 Cockburn (2004) used micro-simulation to analyse the impact of a decrease in trade tax and en 
increase in consumption tax. 
10
 This sector includes the mining industry, food and beverage production, textile and clothing 
production, the chemical industry, metal production, other factories, electricity, gas, water, and finally 
construction. 
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The SAM has been disaggregated in order to distinguish VAT collected by the customs and 
by the general direction of taxes.11 According to the information from the SAM, it can be seen 
that the level of VAT collected is roughly 22% of the sum of payable VAT when considering a 
pure VAT at a 19% rate touching on only final consumption, representing a little less than 5% 
of GDP and 37% of total tax revenues, which is consistent with the available statistics. The 
VAT levied on customs represents 60% of total VAT revenues. The average VAT rate is thus 
significantly below the legal VAT rate, the difference being due to two factors: the high sum 
of VAT exemptions and tax evasion. Most internal VAT revenues come from the taxation of 
industrial goods. As for taxes on foreign trade, the sectors most affected are chemical, oil, 
and manufactured products. Direct taxes do not concern the entire population and the tax 
burden especially concerns the workers in the formal private and public sectors. Individual 
entrepreneurs in the informal sector also pay a direct tax (for example the overall trading 
tax), although the sum of these tax revenues is weak. (Data on the structure of the Nigerien 
economy based on the SAM can be found in Appendix 1.) 
Characteristics of the computable general equilibrium model 
The model draws on EXTER by Decaluwé, et al (2001) as a starting point. It has been 
modified to take into account the specificities of the Nigerien economy and takes up the SAM 
structure presented above. Each sector produces a single good. As a result, there is the 
same number of goods produced as there are production sectors, with the addition of oil, 
which is consumed but not locally produced. Only the “export agriculture” and “industry” 
sectors take part in international trade. The “trade,” “service,” and “food crop agriculture” 
sectors are non-tradable.  
The production technology is represented by constant return to scale which combine labor 
and capital. We suppose full employment of factor. Labor is mobile from one sector to 
another while capital is fixed. The fixity of capital can be explained in Niger by the weak 
development of financial markets and the difficulty of transformation of capital in the short- to 
medium-term. Hence, the model considers the short-to medium term influences of a tax 
policy. The level of intermediate consumption is linked to production by fixed technical 
coefficients. The functional form describing the level of value added is a production function 
with constant substitution elasticity taking into account labour/capital substitution. Producers 
in each sector maximize profits subject to their technology constraint and determine optimal 
factor’s demand.  
The double Armington assumption is used to distinguish imports and domestically produced 
                                                          
11
 The initial SAM accounted for the VAT collected in levy in import taxes without distinction, which 
strongly underestimated VAT revenues. 
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goods, implying imperfect substitutability and to differentiate exports from goods for domestic 
use. The production possibility frontier of the economy is defined by a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function between domestic supply and export and this yields the export 
supply function. The model defines a composite commodity made up of domestic demand 
and final imports, which is consumed by the households, firms and government. We assume 
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function between domestic demand and final 
import demand and this provides the import demand function. Import and locally produced 
goods are subject to the same taxation structure. The parameters of CES and CET functions 
are exogenously determined. 
Households receive income from primary factor payments that they hold directly, transfers 
from government and from the rest of the world. Households spend in the consumption of 
goods and services, pay taxation, and saved. Household demands are represented by a 
linear expenditure system (LES) derived from the maximization of a Stone-Geary utility 
function. The analysis of the distributional impact of tax reform is complemented by a micro-
simulation module in which demand functions are the same as those used in the CGE model. 
Government revenues are generated of all levied taxes, i.e. direct taxes, production taxes, 
import duties, export duties, and indirect internal taxes (VAT and excise duties), as well as 
foreign aid and remittances from the rest of the world. As for their tax component, revenues 
depend on exogenous tax rates but also on the variation of their tax base. International 
transfers to the government are exogenous. The government produces public services, 
consumes various goods, and remunerates civil servants. Government savings are residual 
and correspond to government revenue from which are subtracted public expenditures and 
transfers from government to Nigerien households. 
Prices are modelled in standard fashion. Nevertheless, this work highlights a few specificities 
of our modelling of prices such as the market price of goods and services integrating the cost 
of marketing margins and transport margins and their VAT rate. We will detail VAT treatment 
further on. 
The equilibrium conditions and closure of the model are traditional. For each market, 
equilibrium is ensured by a price mechanism that endogenously adjusts the supply and 
demand. Investment is determined by the level of savings of agents. Household savings and 
public savings, for their part, are residual and endogenous. The nominal exchange rate is 
chosen as numeraire; transfers between the various agents and foreign saving are 
exogenous and fixed to their initial values. The balance of payment is balanced by the 
adjustment of the real exchange rate. Public expenditure is fixed, which is easily explained in 
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a developing country such as Niger12 and corresponds to our analytical frame distinguishing 
the effect of an increase in public revenues and the establishment of an effective policy for 
poverty reduction.  
Specificities in the treatment of internal indirect taxation  
The value added tax is an ad valorem tax applies theoretically to the price of the composite 
good (locally produced and imported goods) including trade and transport margins. 
Exemption is modelled as a supplementary tax paid by the producer during the purchase of 
intermediate consumptions. Because of the hypothesis of perfect competition, the producer 
cannot charge this tax burden on the sales price of the output. We have consequently 
modelled two types of VAT: one concerning the price of intermediate consumptions (TCI) 
when the final good is exempted and when VAT credit are not refund, and the other 
concerning the final retail price (TC). If the VAT rate affecting intermediate consumptions is 
positive, the price of intermediate consumptions increases for the producer and the value 
added price decreases. The VAT exemptions are thus taken into account and the VAT is not 
only a consumption tax 
VAT rate applied to final consumption and to intermediate consumptions is calculated at the 
base year according to the proportion of VAT revenues collected on intermediate 
consumption goods. The sum of VAT collected on intermediate goods in food crop 
agriculture can be explained by the large number of exemptions but also by the informality of 
the sector. In export agriculture, VAT collected on intermediate goods is due to the non-
application of zero-rate. This repayment default concerning exporting firms exists in Niger.13 
In industry, VAT exemptions primarily concern the mining sector and firms that produce food, 
beverages, and tobacco. In services, it is foremost hotels and restaurants that are 
concerned. The proportion of VAT collected on intermediate consumption goods is fixed by 
sector, according to the available statistics.14 It is 80% of total VAT revenues for food crop 
agriculture; 60% for export agriculture, and 30% for the sector of industry and services. The 
sectors that bear the greatest tax burden on intermediate consumption are in fact export 
agriculture and industry, and this is related to the level of input use in production. The burden 
of VAT collected on intermediate consumptions in the initial situation influences the results of 
our simulations when the pure VAT system is re-established and when the cascading effect 
is cancelled. With this distribution of collected VAT revenues, we obtain the VAT rates 
presented in Table 1. 
                                                          
12
 Between 1999 and 2003, government spending remained stable between 17 and 18% of GDP. 
13
 Report: l’évaluation de l’application des directives de l’UEMOA, portant harmonisation des 
législations des Etats membres en matière de taxe sur la valeur ajoutée et de droits d’accises. 
14
 Information on the sum of exemptions is provided by the country's DGI for the year 2006. 
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Table 1: Effective VAT rates in Niger according to sector and tax base 
Sectors TC rate TCI rate 
Food crop 
agriculture 0.02 0.80 
Export agriculture 0.73 6.59 
Industry 7.50 7.72 
Service 0.04 0.05 
TC: VAT rate on final consumption, TCI: VAT rate on 
intermediate consumptions. Authors’ calculations based 
on data from the SAM, 2004. The calculation method can 
be consulted in Appendix 2. 
We have considered low substitution elasticities of foreign trade for all products. In other 
words, we assume in standard fashion that there is a significant differentiation between 
domestic, exported, and imported products (de Melo 1998). We have done the same for the 
substitution elasticity of production factors (Appendix 4).  
 
3. Differential analysis of the social impacts of different VAT systems 
 
To analyse the effect of the end of exemption, five simulations were run. The first two options 
(simulations 1a and 1b) take up one of the propositions for Nigerien economic policy, namely 
the application of a uniform rate and the broadening of the tax base to primary consumer 
goods. The theoretical objective of a single-rate VAT system is not a high rate but the largest 
possible tax base, thus distributing the tax burden over the economy while favouring optimal 
budget performance. This is made possible by exploiting tax loopholes, by a near-zero sum 
of exemptions and by the taxation of agriculture (Bonjean and Chambas, 2001). These two 
first simulations capture the implementation of a pure VAT in the Nigerien economy in its 
theoretical dimension: no VAT on intermediate consumptions for any sectors expressing the 
total absence of VAT exemptions. In simulation 1a, we restore the official rate of 19% VAT 
imposed by the Finance act. In simulation 1b, we reduce the VAT rate at 10% as a result of 
the expansion of the tax base, which is consistent with the logic of the single rate. The model 
considers an endogenous public revenues and an exogenous VAT rate in order to assess 
the impact of a pure VAT on both public revenues and poverty.  
The principle of “Equal Yield Tax Analysis” (Shoven and al., 1990) is made for the two 
following simulations. It aims to compare various taxation schemes while keeping constant 
the public expenditure and the State revenue. This analytical approach is adapted to capture 
the intrinsic incidence of alternative tax scenarios by isolating them from induced effects 
which may be related to the change in the State revenue, the State expenditures and 
savings. The public revenue in simulation 1b has been used as reference.  
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Simulation 2 takes into account the difficulty of taxing food crop agriculture products in 
developing economies. These goods are mostly exchanged in the informal sector or home 
consumed, which makes their consumption difficult to control and tax. The exemption of food 
crop agriculture implies maintenance of VAT cascading effect in the sector. This simulation 
should allow us to establish the net social impact of the end of exemptions in a sector where 
produced goods have been by far consumed but where the producer’s vulnerability is also 
very important. Under the hypothesis of budget neutrality, VAT exemptions as well as the 
VAT rate in food crop agriculture are kept exogenous at their initial level but the VAT rate on 
final consumption of other sectors is endogenous and uniform. 
 
In simulation 3, we decide to impose a 5% rate on the whole of food crop agriculture. Under 
the hypothesis of budget neutrality, the VAT rates in the other sectors are endogenous and 
unique. Government revenue is assumed to be the same as in simulation 1b. This simulation 
takes up the economic theory of multiple rates without taking into account realities tied to 
self-consumption and the informal sector, thus enabling a comparison with the theoretical 
system of the single rate. The VAT is fixed exogenously without budget neutrality in 
simulation 4. We have fixed a reduced VAT rate of 5% in the sector of food crop agriculture 
associated with a VAT rate of 15% in the other activity sectors. 
 
The last two simulations (3 and 4) take into account the rigidity of a pure VAT system to test 
the hypothesis of the progressivity of a double-rate VAT system and thus analyse the social 
impacts of this taxation compared to the establishment of a single rate. Various authors have 
concluded that a single-rate consumption tax would be undesirable from an economic and 
social standpoint, as Gautier (2001) shows in his literature review. The establishment of a 
reduced rate on a few sensitive products could provide a way to avoid the multiplication of ad 
hoc or permanent exemptions while avoiding penalizing the consumption of these products 
with a 19% or even 10% tax rate. It is important to note that this VAT system requires proper 
functioning of the tax authorities. The multiple rates can create VAT credits for firms when a 
part of the inputs is taxed at the full rate and the final product, at a reduced rate. To preserve 
neutrality of the VAT, all tax credits must be reimbursed by the tax authorities. 
We will begin with a presentation of the sectoral and macroeconomic results before 
proceeding to a distributional analysis. The macroeconomic results of simulation 1b are 
detailed, as it corresponds to the reference simulation for the comparative analysis under the 
hypothesis of budget neutrality. 
 
  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.06  
 14 
Macroeconomic results  
Results of simulations 1a and 1b   
In the two first simulations (1a and 1b), any possibility of imperfection related to the 
application of VAT have been eliminated (absence of informal sector, improved tax 
collection, absence of market power). VAT rate on final consumption increases considerably 
compared to the initial situation.  The results of simulation 1b, will serve as the reference 
simulation for the subsequent comparative analysis. The results of simulation 1a are 
presented in Table 2 and these shed light on what would take place with the application of a 
pure VAT system associated with a high rate.  
In this simulation (1b), two effects are combined. The first is related to the end of VAT 
exemptions and the second, to the establishment of an effective VAT rate of 10%. The 
restoration of VAT neutrality in the production process leads to a decrease in the cost of 
intermediate consumptions, which increases the value added price, irrespective of sectors. 
While the value added increases in food crop agriculture and services—expanding sectors—
it decreases in industry and export agriculture. The increase in value added is nonetheless 
not sufficient in these two sectors to compensate the increase in cost of the labour. There is 
a reallocation of the labour towards food crop agriculture and services. In terms of foreign 
trade, this simulation shows that from this point on, the same tax level applies for selling 
locally or exporting (the zero rate of VAT being correctly applied) and the decision is made 
solely according to relative prices. Contrary to the other sectors, domestic price in industry 
decreases, which favours exports and reduces the price for the producer (the largest share 
of industrial production is sold locally in the initial situation). This situation favours the 
purchase of locally produced goods. The domestic price for other goods including export 
agriculture increases. It penalizes local sales in favour of imported goods. The fix current 
account balance explains that increase in exports finances imports. The export agriculture 
and industry sectors experience an impact different from the other branches owing to the 
greater burden of VAT on their intermediate consumption modelled in the reference situation, 
but also given their positioning on the international market. 
When we integrate an official 10% VAT rate on the whole of goods and services, we see that 
the net effect is different than the one tied to the elimination of exemptions. On the local 
market, while the decrease in the domestic price resulted in a decrease in the price of the 
composite good permitting a decrease in the price of intermediate consumptions, the VAT 
rate strongly increases retail prices, which reduces domestic demand. Only the industrial 
good follows a different trend, as it benefits from a sufficient reduction in the price of the 
composite good for the VAT increase not to increase its retail price. Because industry is a 
  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.06  
 15 
driving force in the economy (production and investment), this amplifies the demand on this 
sector and its expansion. Given our modelling assumptions, the behaviour of the retail 
branch depends on the level of production in the rest of the economy. The decrease in the 
value added price leads to a decrease in the demand for labour, except in industry. It can be 
seen that the average wage does not change compared to the initial situation. The earned 
rate of return follows the same trend as the sectors' demand for labour. The variations of 
factor payments and factor allocation affects the level of disposable income of households 
and thus their welfare, the poverty level, and inequalities, which we will analyse in the 
distributional analysis. 
In terms of public finance, the end of exemptions and the increase in the effective VAT rate 
yields a considerable increase in tax revenues. The government benefits from exemptions’ 
suppression and from the re-establishment of a 10% effective VAT. VAT revenues now 
represent 11.70% of the GDP. Overall government revenue increases by 40.30%. The result 
in terms of public finance is nevertheless conditional upon the efficiency of the tax system. 
The positive effect noted on public finance impacts the level of investment by an increase in 
value of 45.05% compared to the initial situation. This is primarily a result of government 
savings since the total savings of Nigerien households decrease. 
The reduction in VAT exemptions allows the industrial sector to develop by increasing the 
domestic demand (intermediate consumption, investment) as well as its participation in 
foreign trade, but the size of the other sectors is reduced given the strong reduction in the 
local demand of households. It should be noted that with a single VAT rate of 10%, the 
macroeconomic variables only slightly vary compared to the initial situation (which is not the 
case with a 19% VAT rate) where public finance improves considerably.  
Results of simulations 2 and 3  
Under the hypothesis of budget neutrality, the major macroeconomic indicators are only 
slightly influenced by the different simulated VAT systems. The evolution of public finance, 
investment, average wage, and the price index remain similar in simulations 1b, 2, and 3. 
Government revenues are fixed to the sum defined in simulation 1b. We should note that the 
variation in the utility of the representative agent remains similar. 
In simulation 2, the VAT rate in sectors other than food crop agriculture is established at 
12.86%. Preserving food crop agriculture as an informal sector thus requires a VAT increase 
on other goods. Maintaining food crop agriculture as a sector under taxation opens the way 
for supporting its development through a stabilization of domestic demand compared to the 
other strongly taxed goods. The value added price of food crop agriculture still decreases, as 
producers must now obtain intermediate consumptions at a 10% VAT rate without the 
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possibility of having their VAT credits reimbursed. This produces stronger VAT cascading 
effect compared to the initial situation, in which the other sectors were also less strongly 
taxed. Nonetheless, the value added price of food crop agriculture decreases only slightly, as 
Nigerien farmers use very few inputs. Food crop agriculture can thus maintain its activity 
compared to the other sectors experiencing a slow-down in their development comparable to 
that of a pure VAT system (except for industry, cf. simulation 1b). The production factors 
move from export agriculture and services to industry, as in simulation 1b. Food crop 
agriculture maintains its production capacities. In this simulation, the additional cost 
produced by the VAT exemption is reduced by a decrease in the retail price on this good, 
which is not the case for the other sectors taxed at 10%. The price index increases slightly at 
105.16 and total private consumption decreases in volume by 5.30% with a strong decrease 
for the consumption of services and a slight decrease for food crop agriculture.  
When a dual VAT rate with a reduced rate is introduced in food crop agriculture at 5% and an 
endogenously fixed VAT rate on other goods at 11.37%, the macroeconomic situation comes 
closer to the results of simulation 1b but do not favour consumption of the other goods any 
more than in simulation 2. 
Results of simulation 4   
The introduction of a multiple-rate VAT structure with a 5% reduced rate in food crop 
agriculture and a 15% rate in the other sectors yields a 59.36% increase in public revenues 
compared to the initial situation, that is, 19 percentage points more than when we apply 
budget neutrality or with a single rate of 10%. Public savings, and hence investment, 
increase substantially. The VAT revenues now correspond to 15.1% of GDP, which is 
significantly higher than the WAEMU average and shows higher budget performance than 
with a 10% single rate. Household welfare nevertheless decreases by 10.51%, more than 
two points higher compared to the previous simulations. In terms of production, the situation 
is not very different from simulation 3. 
On the whole, we observe that the macroeconomic effects of the different scenarios are very 
similar. However, it is important to analyse whether anticipations of the regressive nature of a 
pure VAT materialize through our distributional analysis. This analysis will also enable us to 
identify the best options in distributional terms.  
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Table 2: Macroeconomic results of the simulations (Δ %) 
Selected variables Sim1a   Sim1b Sim2 Sim3 Sim4  
Production       
     food crop agriculture -8.85 -4.85 -0.26 -2.72 -2.91 
export agriculture -3.66 -2.56 -3.97 -3.25 -3.95 
industry 20.67 11.66 10.08 11.06 13.62 
services -7.03 -3.68 -4.93 -4.34 -5.73 
trade 0.21 0.15 -0.42 -0.12 -0.24 
Labour demand  
-1.95 0 -0.1 -0.11 -0.74 
Wage rate 
food crop agriculture -9.43 -5.17 -0.28 -2.91 -3.10 
export agriculture -4.01 -2.81 -4.35 -3.56 -4.34 
industry 21.07 11.87 10.26 11.26 13.86 
services -7.58 -3.98 -5.33 -4.69 -6.19 
trade 0.22 0.15 -0.44 -0.13 -0.25 
Remuneration of capital       
food crop agriculture -16.86 -8.47 -0.56 -4.90 -5.82 
export agriculture -8.42 -4.64 -7.24 -5.97 -7.81 
industry 34.85 20.56 17.56 19.33 23.25 
services -14.02 -6.54 -8.82 -7.79 -10.77 
trade -1.95 -8.47 -0.10 -0.11 -0.74 
Foreign trade      
Export       
export agriculture -2.35 -2.06 -3.37 -2.68 -3.10 
industry 23.04 13.06 11.49 12.48 15.35 
Import       
food crop agriculture -11.28 -5.59 -0.71 -3.38 -4.06 
export agriculture -7.47 -4.02 -5.73 -4.91 -6.44 
industry 13.03 7.10 5.48 6.44 7.98 
Domestic demand      
food crop agriculture -8.85 -4.85 -0.26 -2.72 -2.91 
export agriculture -4.08 -2.72 -4.16 -3.43 -4.23 
industry 19.61 11.04 9.45 10.43 12.84 
services -7.03 -3.68 -4.93 -4.34 -5.73 
Public finance      
Government tax revenue  100.18 40.30 40.30 40.30 59.32 
Public savings  842.14 350.35 350.35 350.35 515.73 
VAT revenues  333.48 132.79 135.39 134.62 199.53 
VAT/GDP 22.30 11.79 11.79 11.75 15.10 
Various indicators       
General price index 111.44 105.66 105.16 105.31 107.21 
Total investment  112.4 45.07 46.91 46.93 68.79 
Traded GDP  -2.37 -0.25 -0.33 -0.36 -1.04 
Non-traded GDP  -1.55 0.05 -0.29 -0.31 -0.89 
Households      
Household welfare -16.81 -7.37 -7.25 -7.46 -10.51 
Net disposable income -2.05 -0.22 -0.65 -0.62 -1.30 
Private consumption  -12.56 -5.50 -5.30 -5.54 -7.78 
 food crop agriculture -11.74 -6.34 -1.06 -3.91 -4.38 
export agriculture -14.57 -7.55 -9.02 -8.38 -11.02 
     industry -10.44 -2.08 -3.86 -3.10 -6.23 
services -14.82 -7.61 -9.16 -8.48 -11.20 
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 Distributional analysis 
The micro-simulation model associated with the CGE model enables us to study the effects 
of an economic policy for households observed in the survey. This technique takes into 
account the heterogeneity of households in terms of both their income structures and their 
expenditure structures observed in the household survey. This type of analysis is not 
possible with an approach based on representative agents. Moreover, according to Savard 
(2005), distributional analysis by representative agent can lead to qualitatively and 
quantitatively different conclusions. This type of model combining CGE and micro-simulation 
modules enables the distributional impact analysis of a tax policy on the real income of each 
household. Indeed, the model allows us to obtain new revenue and expenditure vectors after 
each simulation of economic policies implemented. New real income vector are computed 
after each simulation and thus it is possible to re-estimate poverty and inequality indices at 
the reference period and for each scenario. 
Our study draws on data from the 2005 Questionnaire Unifié sur les Indicateurs de Base du 
Bien-être (QUIBB) including 6 690 Nigerien households. The poverty analysis is performed 
using the usual Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) poverty measures (FGT) 15. This covers 
poverty incidence (α=0), depth (α=1), and severity (α=2). The poverty line used is 105 827 
CFAF per year per capita in rural areas and 144 750 CFAF in urban areas in 2005 (PNUD 
2005). As for the inequality measure, we selected the Gini index.  
Four household groups were identified, first taking into account the place of residence: urban 
(households residing in Niamey and in other urban centres) and rural areas and second 
taking into account the main sector of activity of the head of household: agriculture or non-
agriculture. The four groups analysed are thus Uagri, Ragri, Unagri, Ragri respectively 
representing 3.2%, 60%, 13.1%, and 23.7% of Nigerien households.16  
Table 3: Structure of average consumption among Nigerien 
households 
Household groups Uagr Ragr Unagr Rnagr 
Food crop agriculture 43.66 56.53 38.26 52.40 
Export agriculture 16.48 14.33 16.94 15.37 
Industry 34.06 25.58 33.72 27.53 
Services 5.8 3.56 11.08 4.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the QUIBB_2005 
                                                          
15
 The distributional analysis was conducted using DASP (Distributive Analysis Stata Package) 
software. 
16
 It is important to point out that the decomposition of households is independent from the CGE 
model. It is carried out based on data from the QUIBB survey. 
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Regardless of the group, the average per capita expenditure of households in food crop 
agriculture remains the largest expenditure item, followed by the industrial good. Self-
consumption is included in food crop agriculture 17 .The importance of expenditures in 
agricultural goods may justify the fact that government and donor agencies favour this 
expansion of the tax base. We observe that the difference in the consumption structure 
depends more on the area of residence than on the activity of the head of household. For 
urban households with or without agricultural activity, food crop agriculture exhibit lower 
share of expenditure and their consumption is more diversified. Industrial goods and services 
occupy a slightly less important place in their budget ( 
Table 3). 
 
We observe a relation between obtaining revenue from agriculture and the level of poverty, 
irrespective of the area of residence. The group least affected by poverty is the urban non-
farmers (34%) while rural households headed by a farmer are most affected by poverty 
(70.8%). The Gini coefficient measuring the degree of inequalities has a value of 0.46 in 
2005 in Niger (INS). Regardless of the group examined, the degree of inequalities is 
comparable despite a slightly higher rate among urban dwellers who do not obtain their 
revenue from agriculture (0.434). 
 
Table 4: Analysis of poverty and inequalities in Niger 
  Uagr Ragr Unagr Rnagr 
Incidence (FGT0) 70.8 64.4 34.0 53.1 
Depth (FGT1) 30.3 25.8 10.8 19.4 
Severity (FGT2) 15.9 13.3 4.8 9.6 
Gini 0.427 0.429 0.434 0.428 








                                                          
17 Self-consumption is more important in rural area. In the micro simulation model we have 
consider self-consumption as a capital income. Self-consumption and food crop agriculture 
can be combined due to their under taxed character. 
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Figure 118 presents the variations in the FGT indices for the four household groups and for 
the five simulations. 
Figure 1: Variation of household poverty indices (%) 
 
    Authors' calculations, results of the micro simulation on DASP 
Budget neutrality allows us to evaluate the effects of the various VAT systems by 
dissociating the macroeconomic effects from the microeconomic effects. First, we can see 
that regardless of the simulation considered, all poverty indices increase compared to the 
reference period. The results concerning the rural non-farm group are insignificant except for 
the simulation 1a. The extent of the deterioration of the situation differs according to the 
group and the simulation.19  
The expansion of the tax base to the whole of consumer goods and the re-establishment of a 
pure VAT system is costly in social terms (simulations 1a and 1b). If we consider simulation 
1b, we can see that the most negatively affected group is the agricultural rural households 
(Ragr) with a 7.92% increase in poverty incidence. This group was initially the second 
poorest. The increase in the poverty depth and severity for this simulation is nevertheless 
greater for those in urban agricultural households (Uagr), that is, the poorest household 
group at the reference situation. It is also interesting that even if the effects on poverty are 
greater in terms of the impact on agricultural households residing in rural areas compared to 
those in urban areas, the variations in average revenue in these two groups are very similar 
(Appendix 5). This suggests that price effects play an important role for changes in poverty 
indices for rural agricultural households. We should note that this is true regardless of the 
                                                          
18 
The results for each simulation and for each poverty index are available in Appendix 1. 
19
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simulation, but it is less marked in other cases. Households obtaining their income from a 
non-agricultural sector are less concerned. It can also be seen that reducing the VAT rate to 
10% (simulation 1b) reduces the negative social repercussions of an expansion of the tax 
base compared to a 19% single rate (simulation 1a).   
Considering a more realistic tax base by maintaining food crop agriculture under taxation is 
much less negative in terms of poverty variation (simulation 2). For a similar macroeconomic 
activity, the variation in the effect of poverty on rural agricultural households drops from 
7.92% to 3.37%. The increase in the depth and severity indices is also much weaker. We 
should note that our results are significant only for the groups of rural farmers and non-
agricultural urban groups. 
Establishing a dual VAT rate by taxing food crop agriculture at a reduced rate of 5% 
(simulation 3) amplifies all poverty impact for all groups except for rural non-farmer, 
compared to the initial situation and compared to simulation 2. Indeed, poverty incidence 
increases by 5.83% for the group of rural agricultural households, i.e. 2.46 percentage points 
more than simulation 2. It should be noted that the negative social impact of this VAT system 
is nonetheless weaker with a single-rate VAT of 10%. When compared to uniform rate, 
allocating taxes on all goods increases poverty even when the full rate of this system (11.4%) 
is higher than the uniform rate (10%). 
Finally, if we compare simulation 4 with simulation 1b without budget neutrality, we can see 
that putting into place a dual-rate VAT system will imply that the government will favour one 
group over another. The difference in terms of poverty increase primarily affects rural 
farmers. Maintaining the reduced rate in food crop agriculture, thus permitting support of 
agricultural activity and hence revenues, increases the poverty of this group in lesser 
proportions than the single rate of 10%. Urban non-farmers for their part are more affected 
by the dual rate, which follows the same logic. 
The establishment of a reduced rate of 10% (simulation 1b) or multiple rates (simulation 3) 
reduce inequalities among rural households regardless of their activity, as well as among 
urban non-farm households. It is difficult to define what type of VAT system is preferable 
between simulation 1b and 3, despite the fact that the single rate allows a greater reduction 
in inequalities within the group of rural farmers. Simulation 2, maintaining VAT exemptions in 
food crop agriculture, does not provide significant information when it comes to the 
modification of inequalities, which prevents concluding on the benefits of this fiscal policy on 
this criteria ( 
 




Figure 2: Variation in the Gini index (%)20 
 
Authors' calculations, results of the micro simulation on DASP 
Although restoring the VAT rate would be socially costly compared to the initial situation, we 
can see that the distributional impact of the VAT differs according to the system implemented 
in the country. As for the impact on poverty, we can conclude that the establishment of a 
single-rate VAT associated with maintaining exemptions in food crop agriculture is preferable 
for all social groups identified, since the negative effect proves to be the weakest. Moreover, 
the reduction observed in inequalities suggests that although the number under the poverty 
line would be higher, it may be possible to target a larger number of households during the 
establishment of compensatory measures favourable to the poor.  
4. Conclusions 
This study has sought to describe the distributional impacts of expanding the tax base to 
encompass agricultural goods by considering various potential taxation systems. To do so, 
we built the first CGEM micro-simulation for Niger and performed a rich distributional analysis 
of a VAT reform in a developing country using this tool.  Three main lessons emerge from 
our application.  
 First, the end of VAT exemptions is necessary to develop the industrial sector, which 
has a strong ripple effect on the rest of the economy. Nonetheless, maintaining VAT 
exemptions in food crop agriculture sectors associated with a tax base expansion in the 
remaining sectors is preferable for the agriculture expansion. On the first hand, this fiscal 
                                                          
20












  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.06  
 23 
choice avoids an increase in the tax burden on consumers which support demand. On the 
other hand, agriculture being a sector that uses little intermediate consumption, the tax 
burden tied to VAT exemptions is weak for the producer, which maintains the level of activity 
of this sector and hence the remuneration of farmers. The net distributional impact of VAT 
exemptions depends on the economic structure economic sectors and the initial tax burden 
on intermediate consumption. Furthermore, irrespective of the VAT system chosen, one must 
correctly apply the zero rate of VAT to avoid creating distortions between sales on the local 
market, where the VAT is neutral, and exportation. 
 Secondly, the model shows that applying a pure VAT structure conforming to the 
theory (simulation 1b) is preferable in terms of economic growth whereas applying a 
reduced-rate on food crop agriculture lightens the negative distributional impact of the 
elimination of exemptions compared to a single rate (simulation 4). The pure VAT structure 
induces an increase in poverty especially for rural farmers, the largest and second poorest 
group in Niger. Both simulations without imperfection in VAT application are border case. 
 Finally, when we take into account budget neutrality, we can see that maintaining 
VAT exemptions in food crop agriculture (simulation2) is the most judicious choice compared 
to a 5% VAT rate taxation of goods produced by this sector (simulation3). It is not the 
multiple rate VAT that is more progressive but the one with the tighter fiscal base 
 It must be kept in mind that all of our results relative to the establishment of a single 
rate, multiple rates, or exemptions on certain goods depend on the ability of the Nigerien’s 
tax authorities to control and reimburse VAT credits. To date, no study has evaluated the 
administrative cost of implementing the above-described VAT systems in developing or 
developed countries. 
 We intend to pursue this analysis by modifying certain hypotheses of the model and 
introducing different market structures in certain sectors of the economy. This will allow us to 
take into account the power of retailers and/or producers to determine market prices.  
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Industry Services Trade Total 
Mi/Qi 11.13 6.89 43.3   18.53 
Mi/M 10.42 4.48 85.1   100 
EXi/XSi  25.32 30.57   13.14 
EXi/EX  31.36 68.64   100 
VAi/VA 21.4 19.3 20.4 23.9 15.1 100 
VAi/XSi 91.7 85.4 49.9 65.0 100  
XSi/XS 16.8 16.3 29.5 26.5 10.9 100 
LDi/LD 21 19 21 23 15 100 
KDi/LD 23 29 5 30 13 100 
       
LDi/VAi 93 91 98 92 95  
KDi/VAi 7 9 2 8 5  
       
I: sectors, Mi: imports, EXi: exports, Qi: quantity of available goods in the economy, VAi: value added, 
XSi: Production, LDi: labour factor demand, KDi: capital factor demand. 
Authors’ calculations, SAM 2004 
Appendix 2: Presentation of equations for calculating VAT rates in the initial situation  
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Appendix 3: Matrix of technical coefficients  
  Food crop agriculture Export agriculture Industry services 
Food crop agriculture 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.3 
Export agriculture 0.1 0.23 0.12 0.2 
Industry 0.49 0.54 0.56 0.46 
Services 0.38 0.7 0.21 0.49 
Authors’ calculations, SAM 2004 
Appendix 4: Elasticities used in this model  
  
Food crop 
agriculture Export agriculture Industry Service 
Sigma 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Sigmam(1) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Sigmae(2)   0.4 0.4   
(1) is the substitution elasticity of the Armington function (CES) for imports and (2) 
is the transformation elasticity of the CET function for exports. 
Appendix 5: Variation of real average income of household groups (%) 
 yr_sim1a yr_sim1b yr_sim2 yr_sim3 yr_sim4 
Uagr -24.72 -13.73 -8.12 -11.37 -13.96 
Ragr -28.88 -16.33 -5.64 -11.58 -13.68 
Unagr -12.84 -5.67 -5.27 -5.99 -8.28 
Rnagr -8.38 -3.24 1.70 -1.17 -1.75 
Authors’ calculations 
Appendix 6: Simulation results in terms of poverty 
    Uagr Ragr Unagr Rnagr 
sim1a FGTO 11.94** 15.46** 5.91** 3.99** 
 
FGT1 12.20** 12.05** 3.40** 3.21** 
  FGT2 9.56** 8.38** 1.89** 1.87** 
Sim1b FGTO 4.21* 7.92** 1.86** 0.31 
 
FGT1 6.37** 6.05** 1.01** 0.71** 
 
FGT2 4.84** 4.00** 0.47** 0.28* 
Sim2 FGTO 1.53 3.37** 1.37** -1.42 
 
FGT1 3.71** 2.10** 0.77** -0.93** 
  FGT2 2.72** 1.27** 0.34** -0.68** 
Sim3 FGTO 1.87** 5.83** 1.89** -0.90 
 
FGT1 5.17** 4.22** 0.95** -0.06* 
  FGT2 3.87** 2.70** 0.44** -0.19 
Sim4 FGTO 4.22* 6.99** 3.78** -0.29 
 
FGT1 6.34** 5.15** 1.58** 0.28 
  FGT2 4.83** 3.33** 0.81** 0.01 
Authors' calculations, results of the micro simulation on DASP. **significant for a 
threshold of 5%, *significant for a threshold of 10%. 
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Appendix 7: Simulation results in terms of inequalities 
  Niger Uagr Ragr Unagr Rnagr 
sim1a 0.64** 0.37 -1.86** -0.01 -0.30 
Sim1b 0.14 0.08 -1.06** -0.43* -0.77** 
Sim2 -0.11 -0.19 -0.02 -0.29 -0.45 
Sim3 -0.07 -0.13 -0.60** -0.44** -0.70** 
Sim4 -0.05 -0.12 -0.62** -0.33 -0.58 
Authors’ calculations **significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Appendix 8: Equations of the computable general equilibrium model and glossary of 
variables and parameters 
 Sets: 
   =Products/branches;   =Export sectors;   =Import sectors;    =Non-export sectors; 




        Technical coefficient 
    Scale coefficient of the production function 
      Parameter of the production function 
    Exponent of the production function 
   Substitution elasticity labour capital 
    Share of i in investment 
    Parameter of the government expenditure function 
      Propensity to consumption of household H   
        Propensity to consume good i of household h  
        Incompressible consumption in good i of household h 
       Proportion of income from labour of household h 
       Proportion of income from capital of household h 
       Proportion of income from public sector of household h 
     Parameter of the CET function 
    Parameter of the CES function 
    Weight of the CET function 
    Weight of the CES function 
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    Exponent of the CET function 
    Exponent of the CES function 
    Transformation elasticity 
    Substitution elasticity 
        Marginal rates on wage of the trade branch 
 Endogenous variables: 
 
     Household consumption of good i (vol) 
    Government consumption of good i (vol) 
    Total consumption by household type (val) 
       Intermediate consumption of i by j (vol) 
    Demand for local good 
    Supply for local good 
    Exports (vol) 
  Public expenditures (val) 
    Investment in good i (vol) 
    Total investment (val) 
   Capital demand by sector 
   Labour demand by sector 
   Imports 
    Consumption price of good i including VAT 
     Price of intermediate consumptions 
    Price of local good 
    Export price 
    Import price 
    Production price of i 
    Composite good price 
    Sales price taking into account the trade and transport margin  
     Value added price 
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   Composite good 
   Rate of return on capital 
     Disposable income of households 
    Household income 
    Household savings 
   Public savings 
   Government revenue 
   Utility of consumers 
    Production of sector i 
  Average private sector wage 
 Exogenous variables: 
 
  Numeraire exchange rate 
    Capital supply by sector 
   Donations 
   Public employment                 
   Labour supply 
     World prices of imports 
     World prices of exports 
   Foreign savings 
    Export tax rate 
    Import tax rate 
    VAT rate on consumption 
     VAT rate on intermediate consumptions 
    Production tax rate 
    Tax rate on household income 
    Transfers from government to households 
   Average public sector wage 
    Marginal rates on trade 
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    Transfers from the rest of the world to households 
      Foreign worker employment 
           Proportion of total VAT collected on intermediate consumptions 
 
 
 List of equations: 
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